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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRIANGULATING STANDING

JAMES E. PFANDER*
With apologies to Professor Tribe,1 this brief paper explains how one
might use the triangle (and other geometric shapes) to clarify some confusing
features of standing doctrine for visual learners.2 While no one can pretend to
offer a simple account of so vexing a corner of the jurisdictional world, I have
found that a simple triangle (or two) can help students better understand the
issues in such familiar cases as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,3 Allen v.
Wright,4 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,5 Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,6 and Massachusetts v. EPA.7 As
standing mavens know, the cases generally require the plaintiff to identify an
injury in fact, and a causal chain that connects that injury to the wrongful
conduct of the defendant such that a judicial remedy directed at the misconduct
will redress the injury.
My first (and simplest) triangle depicts the relationship between three
familiar parties in standing litigation: a federal government agency (call it the
Environmental Protection Agency or EPA), the firms that the agency regulates
(the regulated party or RP), and the public citizens who presumably agitated
for the adoption of federal standards and will benefit from successful
regulation (call these folks the “public interest,” or PI). Diagram 1 depicts the
situation as follows:

* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. © 2009 James Pfander.
1. See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
2. For general overviews of standing doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 57–116 (5th ed. 2007); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 30–40 (2006). For an overview of learning styles and the importance of teaching
to all styles of learners, see Eric A. DeGroff & Kathleen A. McKee, Learning Like Lawyers:
Addressing the Differences in Law Student Learning Styles, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 499; M.H.
Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
139 (2001).
3. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
4. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
5. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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DIAGRAM 1
The first leg of the triangle depicts a first attempt at regulatory control: the
adoption of regulatory standards by the EPA, perhaps reducing the amount of
emissions a smokestack industry can release into the atmosphere. Once those
standards have been adopted, the EPA can presumably bring an action to
enforce them; if authorized to do so by Congress, it has standing to sue RP for
a violation of federal standards (just as the Department of Justice can typically
bring suit to enforce federal standards against those who violate them).
As noted, the first leg of the triangle does not usually raise standing
questions. But take a moment to consider that conclusion. Has the EPA
suffered any injury in fact as a result of RP’s release of pollutants into the
atmosphere? Perhaps not; indeed, the interests of the agency and the
individuals who set policy, including the agency’s head, the scientists, and
lawyers, seem to resemble those of the public at large. Crucially then, the
power of EPA to sue on what might otherwise look like a generalized
grievance depends on statutory language that confers authority on EPA to
enforce the standards it establishes. That, essentially, was the insight of
Professor Hartnett; Hartnett argued that the right of the government to bring
criminal prosecutions depends not on any injury in fact to the government, but
on the customary and statutory power of law enforcement officials to initiate
criminal proceedings.8 Hartnett’s broader point: that attorneys general, both
public and private, act on behalf of the public at large rather than to remedy an
injury in fact to their own legally cognizable interests, and we tend to regard
statutory authorization as sufficient to enable them to do so.9
Just as the EPA has standing to sue RP for violating federal standards
(assuming the agency’s organic statute authorizes such suits), so too can RP
8. Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV.
2239, 2251 (1999).
9. Id. at 2258.
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sue the EPA. Suppose RP contends that the agency has exceeded its authority
or has set standards that exceed those Congress authorized the agency to
impose. Either sort of claim has long supported an action by a regulated entity
against the agency in charge. One can perhaps best depict this reality by
drawing an arrow from RP to EPA, as in Diagram 2 below.

DIAGRAM 2
Standing thus operates as something of a two-way street; EPA has standing to
sue RP, and RP can return the favor.
A somewhat more complicated set of questions arises when one considers
the possibility that citizens might bring suit against RP directly for violation of
federal standards. At common law, of course, individuals could sue to abate a
nuisance, although the action was available only to those who lived in the
neighborhood. One of the reasons Congress chose to create the EPA was its
dissatisfaction with the existing tools of environmental regulation;10 imagine
the citizens of New England, for example, seeking relief on a nuisance theory
from Midwestern firms whose emissions contribute to acid rain. Still,
individuals can suffer relatively concrete harms as a result of violations of the
EPA’s standards. In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,11
for example, the plaintiffs alleged with some plausibility that they were less
likely to use a particular waterway for swimming and fishing after learning that
the firm had been exceeding the terms of its pollution permit.
The right of citizens to bring suit in such a situation depends both on the
terms of the agency’s organic statute and on standing doctrine. Congress
might, of course, consolidate all enforcement authority in government agencies
(as in the case of criminal prosecutions) and deny private individuals any right
to sue.12 If that occurred, then individuals would have to petition the agency to
10. See S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 4 (1969) (indicating that Congress created the EPA to address
perceived problems in the enforcement of environmental law).
11. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
12. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 2246–51 (discussing criminal prosecutions in this context).
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persuade it to pursue the claim (in the same way that citizens report crimes to
the local prosecutor). Alternatively, Congress might provide that citizens may
sue to enforce the standards set forth in federal law. Diagram 3 depicts such
litigation:

DIAGRAM 3
To bring such a suit, citizens must still satisfy the standing doctrine. So, for
example, an employee may sue her firm for a violation of fair labor standards;
she would surely have a concrete financial stake in the litigation. For
environmental suits, however, the concrete stake may prove more elusive.
Remember that to establish citizen standing in such a situation, the citizen must
show injury, causation, and redressability. In Laidlaw Environmental Services,
those elements were deemed satisfied by the plaintiff’s stake in a clean river13
and in the prospect that the imposition of a fine would deter future unlawful
discharges.14
Many of the most difficult standing issues arise not from direct litigation
between the agency and the RP or between the citizen and the RP. Rather, the
difficulty arises when citizens sue the agency to compel it to get tough on the
RP. Diagram 4 depicts that sort of litigation as follows:

13. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183–85 (2000).
14. Id. at 187.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

TRIANGULATING STANDING

833

DIAGRAM 4
Here, the citizens seek to compel the agency to apply a more rigorous standard
to the industry, or to enforce the law against a particular firm. We might call
these sorts of claims “derivative” to reflect the fact that they seek to change the
behavior of the regulated industry or firm by acting through the regulatory
agency. Such suits have sometimes been called “agency-forcing litigation.”15
A number of famous standing cases involve this sort of derivative, or
agency-forcing, model of litigation.16 In Allen v. Wright,17 for example, the
parents of African-American school children brought suit against the Internal
Revenue Service to compel it to more vigorously enforce the prohibition
against granting tax-exempt status to private schools that maintained racially
discriminatory admissions policies. The plaintiffs invoked their interest in an
integrated public school system; white parents in the South were pulling their
children out of the integrating public schools to attend what some called “white
flight academies.” On the plaintiffs’ view, denial of exemption would alter the
behavior of the schools and the parents who enrolled their children in the
academies; as the loss of a tax subsidy made tuition more expensive (with the
15. For an account, see John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of
Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100.
16. Diagram 4 also captures the core of the Court’s analysis in such cases as Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976). In Linda R.S., the plaintiff sought to compel the state to bring child support
prosecutions against the fathers of both legitimate and illegitimate children on an even-handed
basis. 410 U.S. at 615–16. But the Court found that prosecution would not assure the payment of
child support to the plaintiff and denied her standing. Id. at 618–19. In Simon, the plaintiffs
sought to challenge the IRS decision to drop its requirement that hospitals provide indigent care
to maintain their status as non-profits under the tax code. 426 U.S. at 28. Again, the Court found
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 37. The Court said the plaintiffs might need low-cost
medical care, but they could not show that denial of non-profit tax status would affect their ability
to secure such care. Id. at 42–43. In both cases, in short, the plaintiffs brought derivative or
agency-forcing claims.
17. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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elimination of advantageous tax treatment for charitable contributions), some
white parents on the margin might decide to keep their children in the public
school system.
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. As the Court
explained, the plaintiffs satisfied the first prong of the standing inquiry by
alleging a deprivation of their constitutional right to an integrated public school
education.18 But the plaintiffs could not show causation and redressability; the
Court doubted that a change in the school’s tax exemption would influence the
decisions of white parents about where to enroll their children.19 Of course,
the plaintiffs also contended that they were offended by the provision of any
government support to the private academies. Here, the plaintiffs argued that
tax-exempt status conferred government largesse on racially discriminatory
institutions, thereby causing stigmatic injury to African-Americans. But this
proposed injury was dismissed by the Court as a generalized grievance,
unrelated to any injury the plaintiffs had suffered. As the Court noted, third
parties generally have no cognizable interest in the amount another taxpayer
pays to the IRS.
A variant of Diagram 4 nicely captures the problem in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife.20 There, the public interest group Defenders of Wildlife brought
suit to compel federal agencies to consult with one another about the
environmental impact of certain overseas development projects. Defenders of
Wildlife sued the Department of the Interior, which had recently concluded
that no duty of consultation about environmental impact attached to projects
that the United States was helping to fund overseas. Defenders invoked the
citizen suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act, arguing that its members
had studied the habitat of both the Asian elephant and the Nile crocodile, two
species that appeared to be threatened by the proposed developments. If the
development projects were approved without consultation, the projects might
produce an avoidable impact on habitat. We can depict the litigation as in
Diagram 5:

18. See id. at 756.
19. Id. at 758–59.
20. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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DIAGRAM 5
Diagram 5 seeks to convey the notion that the litigation was doubly derivative.
It rested on the view that required consultations between the Department of
Interior and the overseas development agencies would lead to consideration of
the environmental impact of the projects, and that such consideration, in turn,
would alter the impact of the projects on the species in question. The Court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show the requisite injury by
connecting themselves more closely to the study of the animals in the wild. In
addition, a plurality found this chain of inferences too speculative to support
standing, and it also rejected the notion that the citizen suit provision could
provide decisive support for standing when the requisite injury and
redressability prongs of the analysis were otherwise difficult to establish. In
the end, the Court refused to give effect to the ESA’s citizen-suit provision on
Article III grounds.
The Court has backed away from the broadest implications of the Lujan
decision in subsequent cases. In Federal Election Commission v. Akins,21 the
Court confronted an attempt on the part of a group of voters to compel the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to regulate the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as a “political committee” within the meaning of
federal election law.22 The voters sought information that AIPAC would have
to disclose (lists of donors, contributions, and expenditures) if it were so
regulated by the FEC. The FEC opposed regulation, and argued that the voters
lacked standing. In analyzing the issue, the Court found that the plaintiffs had
satisfied the injury requirement by showing that a decision to regulate would
21. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
22. See id. at 13–14.
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produce information valuable to their roles as informed citizens and voters. As
for causation and redressability, the Court found that a decision in the voters’
favor could lead the FEC to reconsider its regulatory stance. Although the
Court acknowledged that the FEC would retain discretion to decline to regulate
AIPAC even if the plaintiffs succeeded on the statutory issue, such retained
discretion did not foreclose a finding of redressability. Thus, the Court defined
success not in terms of immediate disclosure of information but in terms of
altering the internal agency processes in ways that might produce a different
regulatory outcome down the road.23 It’s fair to say that this focus on the
pragmatic operation of internal agency processes, rather than real-world
effects, represents an important shift away from the approach in Lujan.
Professor Sunstein has made much of the manner in which the Court
frames the injury in criticizing its standing doctrine.24 Sunstein notes, for
example, that in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,25 Alan Bakke
could not necessarily establish that he would have been admitted to medical
school but for the University’s decision to set aside a block of positions for
minority applicants.26 The Court overcame that problem by concluding that
Bakke had suffered an injury to his right to compete in an admissions process
untainted by racial discrimination. Sunstein suggests that other plaintiffs might
work around standing problems by similarly re-characterizing their claims in
terms that emphasize injuries to fair process values.27 Thus, in Allen v. Wright,
perhaps the plaintiffs could have avoided dismissal by characterizing their
injuries as the loss of an opportunity to participate in the desegregation of
school systems unaffected by the distorting effect of unlawful tax deductions.
But as the diagram below suggests, Allen v. Wright and Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke differ fundamentally in terms of the nature of
the litigation. In Allen, the plaintiffs were engaged in agency-forcing litigation
as depicted in Diagram 4. In Bakke, by contrast, the plaintiff sued the
University directly, challenging its program of racial set-asides. Diagram 6
depicts that situation.

23. See id. at 19–26.
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1464–69 (1988).
25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
26. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1465.
27. Id. at 1465–66.
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DIAGRAM 6
One can thus distinguish Allen and Bakke in terms of whether the plaintiff was
suing the wrongdoer directly (Bakke) or was suing an agency to compel it to
regulate a third party more stringently (Allen). Careful framing of the nature of
the injury, as Professor Sunstein suggests, may help more in the context of
direct litigation (Bakke) than in derivative litigation (Allen).
One final wrinkle informs standing analysis: whether or not, in a case that
one might otherwise characterize as a generalized grievance, Congress has
provided the plaintiff with an explicit right to sue. No such right had been
provided in either Allen or Bakke; the decision about whether to recognize
standing was one the Court had to make without the benefit of congressional
guidance. By contrast, Congress had included citizen suit provisions in the
statutes involved in both Lujan28 and Akins.29 Thus, the striking feature of the
Lujan decision was its decision to ignore citizen suit provisions in concluding
that the plaintiffs could not establish the minimum elements of Article III
standing.
Beneath the surface of these cases lies a debate over the proper role of
agencies in a Constitution that imagines only three branches of government:
Congress, the Executive, and the judiciary. Diagram 7 depicts the debate over
the control of federal agencies:

28. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1992).
29. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998).
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DIAGRAM 7
As Diagram 7 suggests, both Congress and the Executive Branch play
important roles in overseeing the administration of agency policy. Congress
controls the purse strings30 and can redefine the agency mission through
amendments to the organic statute.31 Budget hearings and hearings into the
proposed confirmation of agency officials can provide a forum in which
Congress can either nudge or compel agencies to act in line with congressional
preferences. Similarly, the Executive Branch and White House have a good
deal of oversight: the President appoints the top officials of agencies, subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate,32 and can in many cases direct the
operation of the agency or department if he chooses to do so.
Agency capture issues may help to explain why Congress includes citizen
suit provisions in the laws that create new agencies. With standing to sue the
agency if it goes too far, regulated industries have an obvious place at the table
when the agency officials sit down to fashion, say, environmental standards.
Who complains if the agency regulates too laxly? In theory, the task of
avoiding lax regulations falls to the agency itself, but Congress may worry that
agency officials have gotten too cozy with the firms they regulate.33 Public
interest groups may counter the tendency toward agency capture by overseeing
the regulatory process.34 In this way, the decision of Congress to include
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
31. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and
Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 918 (2008) (discussing how amendments were
made to the FDA’s organic statute “to make clear” what Congress wanted).
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
33. The Bush-era scandal in the Interior Department provides a defining, if perhaps not
representative, example of agency officials getting too cozy with regulated industry. See Charlie
Savage, Sex, Drug Use, and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at
A1.
34. See Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen
Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 302 (2005).
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citizen suit provisions in the statute can be seen as a way of assuring interest
groups a place at the regulatory table.35 Interest groups can sound the alarm,
and invite more pointed congressional oversight, if regulations grow too lax.
Although the Court has generally upheld the power of Congress to confer a
degree of independence on federal agencies, some scholars have argued that
such independence violates the Constitution’s insistence on a unitary
Executive. Out of the unitary-executive debate has come a suggestion that
Article III standing doctrine must take account of the separation of powers and
the role of the Executive Branch under Article II.36 On this view, only the
Executive Branch can determine how vigorously or laxly to enforce particular
federal laws.37 The Court has traced this executive power of enforcement
discretion to the Take Care Clause, the provision in Article II that directs the
President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.38 Thus, in Allen v.
Wright, the Court invoked the Take Care Clause in questioning whether
citizens can be permitted through litigation to seek a re-structuring of the
apparatus the Executive Branch uses to fulfill its enforcement obligations.39
Similarly, in Lujan, Justice Scalia highlighted the Take Care Clause as part of
his argument that Congress lacks power to invest private citizens with the
authority to assume the President’s law enforcement obligations.40 Diagram 8
depicts this strong vision of executive primacy as follows:

DIAGRAM 8

35. Id.
36. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 211–12 (1992).
37. See id. at 212.
38. Id.
39. 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
40. 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1991).
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Although this is not the place finally to resolve the debate over the Take Care
Clause and executive primacy in the enforcement of the law, it may not be
amiss to point out that Congress has long used its legislative power to broaden
or narrow the scope of executive discretion.41 When Congress narrows
executive discretion and creates rights, those who believe that they enjoy such
rights can make a fairly strong argument that the federal courts should be open
to hear their claims.42
How then to make sense of the Court’s most recent derivative standing
decision, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency?43 Diagram 9
below attempts to do so:

DIAGRAM 9
The state of Massachusetts brought suit to compel the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to
global warming. In finding that the state had standing to bring the action, the
Court placed special emphasis on two factors: (1) that Congress had included
states among those who could bring suit to protect procedural interests, and (2)
that the state had important sovereign interests to protect (such as the coastal
areas that rising sea levels would inundate). In response to the argument that
EPA’s regulations might have little discernible impact on the Massachusetts
shoreline, the Court noted that the state’s quasi-sovereign status entitled it to
special solicitude in standing analysis. Thus, while the Court continued to
require a showing of causation and redressability, the standards it applied were
somewhat relaxed. Perhaps the addition of a small crown to the depiction of
the state—a crown that represents its status as a sovereign—would help to

41. See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 789
(1984) (“Congress can confer more or less policymaking authority on the Executive by legislating
at a high level of generality or by enacting detailed legislation that leaves very little discretion to
the Executive.”).
42. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
43. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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clarify why this particular form of agency-forcing litigation was permitted to
proceed.
CONCLUSION
Standing doctrine often reflects the Court’s effort to balance the respective
roles of regulatory agencies, the parties they regulate, and the many different
publics they seek to serve. I have found students can keep these complex
relationships better in mind if they see them depicted graphically on the
blackboard or in a slide presentation. By triangulating standing, professors can
provide visual learners with a stronger grasp of this confusing chapter of
jurisdictional law.
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